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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-RESCUING CREDITOR CLAIMS FROM
THE "BLACK HOLE". Coilt Independence Joint Venture v. Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 109 S. Ct. 1361 (1989)*
From 1983 to 1986, Coit Independence Joint Venture (Coit), a
Dallas, Texas real estate concern, procured several loans and engaged
in various other transactions with FirstSouth, F. A.,' a Pine Bluff,
Arkansas-based, federally chartered savings and loan (S&L) associa-
tion.2 Following subsequent irreconcilable financial disagreements,
Coit filed suit against FirstSouth in the 95th Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas in October of 1986.3
In the state court complaint against FirstSouth, Coit claimed
that a " 'profit participation' fee" 4 FirstSouth required Coit to pay as
a condition of receiving certain loans constituted interest that, when
added to the standard accrued interest rate, rendered the loans usuri-
ous under Texas law.' Coit also sought a declaratory judgment that
FirstSouth was its partner in the joint venture by virtue of this profit
sharing interest.6 Finally, Coit claimed that FirstSouth, by violating a
purportedly existing oral agreement which would have allowed Coit
to access funds as needed to improve the property purchased by one
of the loans in question, "breached its fiduciary duty and its implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing" 7 and would further have required
FirstSouth to extend the loan, "by executing any necessary renewal
notes, for at least five years unless the property sold earlier."8
* The author wishes to thank George E. Pike and Harry A. Light of the distinguished
Little Rock law firm of Friday, Eldredge, and Clark for their counsel and guidance in the
writing of this note.
1. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was appointed as re-
ceiver for FirstSouth on December 4, 1986, pursuant to Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Resolution No. 86-1200P. Personal interview with Patricia J. Heritage, Asset Manager, the
FSLIC, Little Rock, Arkansas (May 13, 1989); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1361, 1364 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Coit alleged that FirstSouth required it to pay " 'profit participation' interest" on any
profits derived from sale of the property as a condition of receiving two loans of $20 and $30
million. Id.
5. Id. See also, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11; VERNON'S ANN. CIv. ST. ART. 5069-1.02
et seq. (West Supp. 1989).
6. Coit also sought a declaratory judgment that any outstanding notes were unenforce-
able. 109 S. Ct. at 1365.
7. Id. Coit made this allegation with respect to the $30 million loan.
8. Id. at 1364.
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In December 1986 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank
Board) declared FirstSouth insolvent and appointed the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver. 9 The
FSLIC then removed the Coit case to federal court.' 0 In February
1987 the district court, following Fifth Circuit precedent as handed
down in North Mississippi Savings and Loan Association v. Hudspeth,"
held that the applicable federal statutes and regulations required cred-
itors to present claims brought against the FSLIC in its capacity as
receiver first to the FSLIC.'2 Creditors then had to appeal to the
Bank Board before finally seeking judicial review in the federal courts
where their claims would be considered consistent with the proce-
dures enumerated by the Administrative Procedure Act.' 3 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed and Coit appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. '"
In a unanimous decision written by Justice O'Connor, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the FSLIC does
not have the power to adjudicate creditor claims against the assets of
a failed savings and loan association under FSLIC receivership.' 5
Therefore, creditors are entitled to de novo consideration of their
claims in court.' 6 Moreover, all of the members of the Court except
Justices Blackmun and Scalia held that creditors were not required,
before filing suit in court, to exhaust the administrative remedies pro-
vided by the FSLIC's administrative claims procedure. 17 Coit Inde-
pendence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.,
109 S. Ct. 1361 (1989).
As one United States Congressman' 8 so eloquently noted, the fi-
nancially beleaguered savings and loan (S&L) industry is literally
"hemorrhaging money."' 9 According to the Bank Board, the indus-
9. Id. at 1365. The Bank Board derived its power to appoint the FSLIC as receiver from
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
10. 109 S. Ct. at 1365. The FSLIC, in its capacity as receiver, simply substituted itself for
FirstSouth in Coit's state suit. The FSLIC then removed the case pursuant to authority
granted by 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(2).
11. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985).
12. Id. at 1103.
13. Id. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
14. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1361 (1989).
15. 109 S. Ct. at 1376.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Congressman Brown of Colorado, 135 CONG. REC. H975 (daily ed. July 24, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Brown).
19. Id. For other excerpts from the oftentimes heated Congressional debate surrounding
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try reported losses of $2.3 billion for the fourth quarter of 1988, clos-
ing-out the worst year in thrift history with losses totalling $12.1
billion. 20 Relatively meager industry profits of $516 million 2 1 far from
offset these enormous deficits, and profits are likely to remain de-
creased in 1989 as a result of the effects of rising interest rates on
already troubled real estate investments. 22
The bulk of the 1988 losses was concentrated in a small number
of savings institutions.23 For example, in Texas, seventy-seven insol-
vent thrift accounted for $1.3 billion of these losses.24 Of the twenty
savings associations with the largest quarterly losses, nine were in
Texas.25 The vast majority of these losses originated from savings and
loans that entered inflated valuations of since-defaulting real estate
loans and other "bad" assets on their books.26 Thus, this deficit
merely reflects losses that actually occurred years ago when a number
the S&L crisis and President Bush's legislative efforts to deal with it, see 135 CONG. REC.
S10182 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bentsen, et al); 135 CONG. REC. S9871
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bentsen, et al); 135 CONG. REC. H4972 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Annunzio, et at); 133 CONG. REC. H6944 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1989) (statement of Rep. Akaka, et al); 135 CONG. REC. E2731 (daily ed. July 28, 1989) (state-
ment of Rep. Kaptur); 135 CONG. REC. H4358 (daily ed. July 27, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Kaptur); 135 CONG. REC. H2601 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Conyers); 135
CONG. REC. H2739 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski); 135 CONG.
REC. H2450 (daily ed. June 8, 1989) (statement of Rep. Bates); 135 CONG. REC. E2006 (daily
ed. June 7, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dorgan); 135 CONG. REC. H2343 (daily ed. June 6, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Wolpe); 135 CONG. REC. E638 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Pease); 135 CONG. REC. H2031 (daily ed. May 18, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lafalce); 135
CONG. REC. S4084 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Conrad, et a/); 135 CONG. REC.
S6439 (daily ed. June 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kerry); 135 CONG. REC. S4238 (daily ed.
Apr. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum, et al); 135 CONG. REC. S3970 (daily ed. Apr.
13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mack); 135 CONG. REC. El 192 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1989) (state-
ment of Rep. Laughlin); 135 CONG. REC. El 106 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Pease); and 135 CONG. REC. S5488 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
20. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at Dl, col. 6 and D7, col. 1; Wall Street J., Mar. 22, 1989,
at A2, col. 1 (SW ed.). This $12.1 billion loss far exceeded the previous record deficit of $7.8
billion in 1987. In 1988 the Bank Board took over, sold, or liquidated 223 savings and loan
institutions with assets of more than $100 billion. This resulted in an estimated cost to the
federal government of at least $39 billion.
21. Id. (both of the articles cited, supra note 20, contain different expressions of the same
factual information).
22. Rising interest rates work to depress the real estate market because when interest rates
are high, potential buyers simply cannot afford to pay the interest on loans necessary to
purchase realty. N. PENNEY, R. BROUDE & R. CUNNINGHAM, LAND FINANCING at 25-31
(3d ed. 1985).





444 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:441
of risky real estate loans went into default.27
In February 1989 President George Bush introduced his "savings
and loan bailout plan,"'28 the heart of which lies in the creation of a
new governmental entity, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),
which exceeds in size all but three of the Fortune 500 industrial corpo-
rations.29 Assets of $300 to $500 billion will make the RTC this na-
tion's largest financial institution, more than twice the size of banking
giant Citibank.30 The RTC will have the unenviable task of selling or
managing all of the real estate and other assets inherited from the
hundreds of savings and loan associations that have failed since the
beginning of the "S&L crisis. "31
According to various estimates, rescuing the troubled S&L in-
dustry will cost between $157 and $183 billion. 2 On June 15, 1989,
the United States House of Representatives passed a $157 billion sav-
ings-and-loan bailout plan,33 the largest financial rescue in United
States history. 4 The House vote supported President Bush's demand
for tough industry reforms while rejecting, on a largely party-line
vote, the President's plan to finance the bailout plan through high-
cost, thirty-year off-budget bonds rather than borrowing directly from
the Treasury. 35 Thus, the House failed to prevent the bailout's costs
27. Id.
28. 135 CONG. REC. S6439.
29. Id. Fortune magazine ranks the top 500 industrial corporations according to the size
of their assets.
30. See supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Id. HR 1278, the Finance Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, will cost the industry and taxpayers in excess of $157 billion over the next 33 years.
Under the Bush plan, the federal government, through the RTC, will liquidate or sell more
than 700 insolvent or nearly insolvent savings institutions. See General Accounting Office
Report found at 135 CONG. REC. E2731 (daily ed. July 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kaptur).
33. Wall Street J., June 16, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
34. Ark. Gazette, Aug. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
35. See supra note 20 (both articles contain different expressions of the same factual infor-
mation). The Bush bailout plan proposed to raise $50 billion to close failing S&Ls. However,
whether this cost should be made part of the federal budget was the subject of much heated
debate on Capitol Hill. Under the Bush plan, none of the $50 billion would have been carried
on the government's books, while interest costs on this amount and any other necessary bor-
rowings would have been included in the budget. This would, in effect, have allowed the S&L
industry itself to pay off the ultimate cost of the bailout over thirty years. Id.
Many Democrats believed that the cost of keeping the $50 billion off the federal budget
was too great. They argued that, since the $50 billion would not be financed by Treasury
securities under the Bush plan, the President's proposed budget treatment would cost an addi-
tional $7.5 billion over the life of the plan. These Democrats sought to finance the plan on the
budget through the sale of Treasury bonds. This method of financing would have required the
passage of an exemption to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget-balancing bill. And, as
Richard Darman, the director of the White House Office of Management and Budget and the
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from swelling the already gargantuan federal deficit.36 The bailout
bill then went to a conference committee which resolved the differ-
ences from a Senate version approved in April. 7
With S&L losses mounting at the rate of approximately $33 mil-
lion a day, $1.4 million each hour, $23,000 a minute,38 the White
House, recognizing the urgency of resolving the S&L crisis, insisted
that Congress enact the bailout bill into law before recessing in Au-
gust. 39 The Summer of 1989 was a long, hot one in Washington, D.C.
The FSLIC and its parent agency, the Bank Board, played an integral
role in, and were drastically affected by, landmark legislation which is
to bring about the ultimate resolution of this unprecedented and po-
tentially economically debilitating financial crisis.'
Both the FSLIC and the Bank Board were created by and em-
powered through a complex statutory framework enacted over a pe-
Bush Administration's point man in the budget debate, warned, putting the S&L bailout costs
on the federal budget could destroy the Gramm-Rudman process and tempt Congress to ex-
clude other items, such as social security, from the budget. Mr. Darman also conjured up
visions of "Black Monday," the stock market crash of the Fall of 1987, when he argued that
such on-budget financing could unnerve participants in the financial markets. Id.
The conference committee compromise which led to the passage of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (see infra note 40), provides for $20
billion on-budget financing for fiscal year 1989, with borrowings of $30 billion placed off-
budget in future years. See 135 CONG. REC. H5300 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Gonzalez); see also Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1298 at 1 501-03 (extra ed. Aug. 9,
1989).
36. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at Dl col. 6 and D7 col. 1 and Wall Street J., Mar. 22,
1989, at A2, col. 1 (SW ed.).
37. Id. The Senate version of the legislation was S774. See Banking Rep. (BNA) Vol. 52,
No. 17 at 895-914 (Apr. 24, 1989).
38. 135 CONG. REC. H975.
39. See Ark. Gazette, June 16, 1989, at Cl, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, June 16, 1989, at
Al, col. 1.
40. On August 4, 1989, Congress passed HR 1278, The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, P.L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. See Ark.
Democrat, Aug. 10, 1989, at AI, col. 4. With the words, "I'm proud to sign this monster," on
August 9, 1989, President Bush signed HR 1278 into law. Id. The principal features of the
Act include, among other things, the dissolution of the Bank Board and the FSLIC, and crea-
tion of a new S&L insurance fund called The Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF,
pronounced "safe"). See Ark. Democrat, Aug. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
In February of 1989, the three-member Bank Board was reduced to a single member,
leaving in place only Chairman M. Danny Wall. Effective October 1, 1989, the Bank Board
was replaced by the Federal Housing Finance Board Office of Thrift Supervision. However,
the twelve federal home loan banks remained intact. The Federal Housing Finance Board will
continue the Bank Board's supervision of thrift receiverships. Telephone interview with Bill
Stanley, Manager of Asset Financing, Eastern Regional Office (formerly the FSLIC as Re-
ceiver), Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 10, 1989).
A principal purpose behind the passage of the FIRREA was to separate the insurance and
regulatory functions of the FSLIC. The insurance function was transferred to the FDIC
which will manage the SAIF. The regulatory function was transferred to the newly created
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riod of fifty years.4' Prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the
states chartered and regulated savings and loan associations.4 2 How-
ever, due to depositors' anxiety about the safety of their money and
subsequent heavy withdrawals from savings accounts, 43 mortgage
loan defaults, and limited funds for home mortgages during the De-
pression era, Congress passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of
1932.4" The Act provided for the creation of as many as twelve fed-
eral home loan banks throughout the country which loaned money to
savings and loan associations and certain other mortgage lenders.45
The Act also created the Bank Board and charged it with the respon-
sibility of overseeing these home loan banks and financing them
through the sale of bonds.46
Among other things, the Bank Board administered and enforced
the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA)47 and Title IV of the
National Housing Act.48 The Bank Board possessed exclusive au-
thority to appoint the FSLIC as receiver or conservator of a federal
savings and loan association upon a finding that any one of five specif-
Federal Housing Finance Board Office of Thrift Supervision. Personal interview with Harry
A. Light, attorney at Friday, Eldredge & Clark, Little Rock, Arkansas (Sept. 5, 1989).
With its principal offices in Atlanta, Dallas, Kansas City, and Denver, the RTC will serve
as receiver for all S&Ls declared insolvent after January 1, 1989. The receiver will be "the
FDIC as Managing Agent for the FSLIC, Resolution Fund as Receiver for [name of insolvent
S&L]." Telephone interview with Bill Stanley, supra. Taxpayer funds will only be used for
those receiverships under the auspices of the RTC which are deemed insolvent subsequent to
the enactment of HR 1278 (effective date Aug. 9, 1989). HR 1278 establishes a deadline for
the S&L cleanup of January 1, 1993. However this sunset provision is subject to extension by
Congrss. Id.
For the complete text of the FIRREA, the accompanying Conference Committee Report,
and an explanation of the Act, see Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1298 (extra ed. Aug. 18,
1989). For an abbreviated analysis of the key provisions of the FIRREA, see Banking Report
(BNA) Vol. 53, No. 7 (Special Supp. Aug. 28, 1989).
41. See 109 S. Ct. at 1366; see also Note, Administrative Law-Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation: Exclusive Adjudication of Creditor Claims in Receivership Proceedings,
10 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 227, 227-31 (1988); see generally, Annotation, Appointment By
Federal Home Loan Bank Board of Receivers or Conservators To Oversee Affairs of Savings and
Loan Associations, Pursuant to § 5(d)(6) of Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C.S.
§ 1464(d)(6)), 65 A.L.R. FED. 302 (1982).
42. See 109 S. Ct. at 1366.
43. This is strikingly similar to what is happening during the current crisis. Since May of
1988, S&L depositors have withdrawn a total of $35.5 billion. 135 CONG. REC. H975.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
47. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-30f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see 12 C.F.R. § 500.1 (1988).
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ically enumerated grounds existed.49 Subsequent statutes extended
the Bank Board's power to appoint the FSLIC as receiver of insolvent
state-chartered thrifts.5°
The FSLIC was a federal agency organized pursuant to Title IV
of the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934.5' The FSLIC insured
the accounts of eligible state-chartered savings and loan associations,
various state banks, and all federal savings and loan associations. 52
The FSLIC had authority, both by statute and federal regulations
promulgated by the Bank Board, to supervise and examine all thrifts
under its auspices, to enforce all applicable laws, regulations or condi-
tions against the insured institutions it oversaw, and to serve as con-
servator or receiver of an insured institution which was in default.53
The FSLIC operated under the direction and control of the Bank
Board.5 4
Once the Bank Board appointed the FSLIC as receiver for an
insolvent savings and loan association, the FSLIC "stepped into the
shoes" of the association, took control of its assets, and had authority
to take any number of steps which it deemed necessary to salvage
depositors' savings. 55
49. The grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver for an association shall
be one or more of the following:
(i) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its obligations to its
creditors and others, including its members;
(ii) substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation or violations of *
law, rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice of practices;
(iii) an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business;
(iv) willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final;
(v) concealment of books, papers, records, or assets of the association or refusal to
submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any
examiner or to any lawful agent of the Board.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
50. See Bank Protection Act of 1968; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c)(2)-(3) Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982; 12 U.S.C. § 1729(l)(B) Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987.
51. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-30f.
52. See 12 U.S.C. § 1726 (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 500.4 (1988).
53. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(a), 1726(b), 1729(c), 1730 (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 500.4
(1988).
54. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1725(a), 1437(b) (1982); see also 12 C.F.R. § 500.4 (1988).
55. Once appointed as receiver, the FSLIC is authorized among other things:
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association;
(ii) to take such action as may be necessary to put it in a sound and solvent
condition;
(iii) to merge it with another insured institution;
(iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over its assets;
(v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or
(vi) to make such other disposition of the matter as it deems appropriate.
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If the FSLIC determined that liquidation was in order, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(d) authorized the FSLIC to "carry on the business of and to
collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to settle, compro-
mise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions,
and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection there-
with."56 Additionally, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) empowered the Bank
Board to adopt rules and regulations governing associations in receiv-
ership, for the conduct of receivership, and for the reorganization,
consolidation, liquidation, or dissolution of insured associations. 7
Moreover, the Bank Board had the express authority to enforce sec-
tion 1464,58 as well as all rules and regulations promulgated thereun-
der, arguably without judicial interference.59
In compliance with this legislative mandate, the Bank Board
adopted comprehensive regulations governing the conduct of receiver-
ships of insured institutions.' The regulations in 12 C.F.R. § 547.7
provide that, upon appointment, a receiver shall "succeed to the
rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the association, and to the
rights, powers, and privileges of its members, officers, and direc-
tors. ' 6 1 Sections 548.2 and 549.3 enumerate the powers and duties of
a receiver. These duties are both diverse and extensive.62
The Bank Board also developed comprehensive regulations deal-
ing with creditor claims made against receivership assets, 63 and the
12,U.S.C. § 1729(b)(l)(A)(i)-(vi) (1982); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 548, 549, 569a (1988).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) (1982).
58. Section 5(d) of the HOLA is identical to 12 U.S.C. § 1464.
59. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(1), 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
60. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 547.1-8, 549.1-8, 569a.1-13 (1988).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 547.7 (1988).
62. 12 C.F.R. §§ 548.2 and 549.3 define the powers and duties of a receiver. Among other
things, a receiver is empowered to:
(1) Do everything he considers desirable or expedient to conserve and preserve the
assets and property of the failed association (12 C.F.R. § 548.2(a));
(2) Pay whatever sums he considers necessary or advisable to preserve, protect,
improve, or rehabilitate the assets or property of the failed association (12
C.F.R. § 548.2(d));
(3) Institute, maintain, defend, or otherwise participate in any legal proceeding by
or against the failed association or in which either has an interest (12 C.F.R.
§ 548.2(f));
(4) Execute, acknowledge, and deliver any instrument necessary for any purpose
(12 C.F.R. § 549.3(b)(2));
(5) Sell or dispose of any assets or property of the failed association for cause or on
terms (12 C.F.R. § 549.3(b)(4));
(6) Repudiate any lease or contract he considers burdensome (12 C.F.R.
§ 548.2(k)).
63. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 549.5, 549.5-1, 569a.7, 569a.8 (1988).
[Vol. 12:441
RESCUING CREDITOR CLAIMS
administration of a claims process became one of the responsibilities
of the FSLIC once it was appointed receiver by the Bank Board.
64
The administrative claims process consisted of two distinct phases:
the initial consideration of claims by the FSLIC in its capacity as re-
ceiver followed by a review, either for an allowed payment or an ap-
peal from a decision disallowing a claim, by the Bank Board.6" Thus,
by Bank Board regulation, the tasks of considering and paying, or of
denying claims against the assets of a failed thrift, lay initially within
the sole discretion of the FSLIC.6 6
Following the FSLIC's initial consideration of claims, the next
step in the claims process involved the Bank Board. Once the Bank
Board allowed a claim, the FSLIC was to pay it "to the extent funds
are available, in such manner and amounts as the Board may di-
rect."67 On the other hand, if the FSLIC disallowed a claim, the
claimant, as a matter of right, had thirty days in which to file "a writ-
ten request for payment regardless of the disallowance, ' 68 which was
then considered and determined by the Bank Board.69 If the claimant
did not file within the thirty day period, this disallowance became
final unless the Bank Board determined otherwise.7"
The recent escalation of thrift failures" and the resulting deple-
tion on the FSLIC's oft-tapped insurance fund, coupled with the
rapid increase in the cost of assisting and liquidating failed thrifts,72
forced the Bank Board and the FSLIC to find ways to expedite these
administrative procedures.73 One of the ways these agencies sought to
contain the ever-increasing costs of receiverships was to develop the
64. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) provides: "The receiver shall allow any claim seasonably re-
ceived and proved to its satisfaction. The receiver may wholly or partly disallow any creditor
claim or claim of security, preference, or priority not so proved, and shall notify the claimant
of the disallowance and the reason therefor."
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(d) (1988).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1988).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Baxter, Life in the Administrative Track:- Administrative Adjudication of Claims
Against Savings Institution Receiverships, 1988 DUKE L.J. 422, 436-39. Between 1934 and
1980, the Bank Board liquidated only 13 thrifts. In 1987 alone, it put 25 into receivership and
liquidated 17. Prior to 1988, the Bank Board's chairman estimated the rate of thrift closure at
one per week. In fact, the Bank Board took over, sold, or liquidated 223 insolvent thrifts in
1988. In Texas alone, the dgency planned to close or merge 104 thrifts during 1988. See Wall
Street J., Mar. 22, 1989, at A2, col. 1.
72. For a breakdown and explanation of these costs, see General Accounting Office Re-
port found at 135 CONG. REC. E2731 (daily ed. July 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kaptur).
73. See Baxter, supra note 71.
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exclusive, internal claims procedure discussed above.74
To establish and enforce this asserted power as receiver to adju-
dicate creditor claims, the FSLIC, relying on both statutory and regu-
latory authority, adopted the practice of removing creditor claims
initiated in state court to federal court. 75 The agency then moved for
their dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 6 The fed-
eral judiciary met this strategy with two responses.
In North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth,77
the court adopted the FSLIC's interpretation of the relevant federal
statutes and regulations. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit firmly en-
dorsed the agency's argument that, as receiver, Congress vested it
with the power to determine for itself the validity of creditor claims,
hence precluding the jurisdiction of the courts to make independent
determinations.78
The court in Hudspeth held that the FSLIC had exclusive juris-
diction to adjudicate claims made against the assets of an insolvent
savings and loan association placed in FSLIC receivership. 79 Any re-
sulting FSLIC determination was then deemed subject to review by
the Bank Board, followed by judicial review pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.80 In Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC8 the Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the "Hudspeth doctrine" and a number of courts
followed the rule. 2
However, after more than a year and a half of relatively unques-
tioned acceptance in the federal courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc. 3 ex-
amined the identical statutory and regulatory materials and rejected
the Hudspeth rule, holding that the FSLIC had absolutely no power
to adjudicate creditor claims.8 4 Faced with challenges to both the
FSLIC's statutory authority to adjudicate claims and the constitu-
tionality of this purported power given the provisions of Article III of
the United States Constitution,8 5 the court in Morrison-Knudsen ex-
74. Id. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
75. See Baxter, supra note 71, at 439-40.
76. Id.
77. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1103.
80. Id. See supra note 13.
81. 790 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. See Baxter, supra note 71, at 443-45 and cases cited therein.
83. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 1222.
85. Article III provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
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amined the Hudspeth interpretation of the relevant federal statutes
and Bank Board regulations and found the court's reasoning in Hud-
speth attenuated and flawed.86
In arriving at its conclusion that the FSLIC did not have adjudi-
catory authority by Congressional delegation, the Ninth Circuit noted
that Congress gave the same authority to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) as it gave to the FSLIC. 7 However, the
FDIC never assumed adjudicatory authority in its capacity as a re-
ceiver of failed financial institutions.8 " Therefore, because of Con-
gress' acquiescence in this long-standing FDIC interpretation of its
receivership role, the court in Morrison-Knudsen was persuaded that
the FSLIC did not possess the power to adjudicate creditor claims.8 9
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the entire statutory
framework strongly suggested that Congress intended the FSLIC to
function merely as a receiver, and not as an adjudicator. 9° The court
reasoned that had Congress intended the FSLIC to be an adjudicator,
it would have devoted substantial attention to both the substantive
and procedural rights of creditors as well as the rights, duties, and
responsibilities of the FSLIC in the adjudicatory process.91
Although Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, it is interesting to note
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in courts staffed by judges with life
tenure and irreducible compensation. Therefore, since the members of the Bank Board only
serve for a limited period of years upon presidential appointment, it is argued that the FSLIC
claims adjudication process violates this provision. Furthermore, for the FSLIC, which is
generally the principal creditor of an insolvent S&L, to serve as an adjudicator of competing
creditor claims, gives rise to significant conflict of interest questions and, hence, due process
considerations. See generally Note, The Adjudicatory Power of the FSLIC Over Claims Involv-
ing Savings and Loans in FSLIC Receivership, 88 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1325, 1347-61 (1988);
Note, Article III and Due Process Limitations on the FSLIC's Adjudicatory Role During its
Receiverships, 76 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1845, 1852-66 (1988). For a discussion of other constitu-
tional issues raised by the Bank Board and FSLIC procedures, see Baxter, supra note 71, at
449.
86. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216-21.
87. Congress created the FDIC as part of the Federal Reserve Act of 1933. The FDIC
insures banks established under the National Bank Act of 1864 as well as other qualified bank-
ing organizations. The Comptroller of Currency appoints the FDIC as receiver for insolvent
banks. Note, supra note 41, at 279.
88. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1219.
91. Id. For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the Morrison-Knudsen opinion, see
Comment, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.: Does Judicial Adjudication Re-
strain the FSLIC as Receiver?, 37 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 511 (1988) and Notes cited supra
note 85.
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that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas in
Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corp.9 2 chose to follow the Morrison-Knudsen approach,
although basing their decisions on somewhat different reasoning.9"
Neither Morrison-Knudsen nor the decisions that followed it directly
addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the FSLIC's adjudica-
tory authority (assuming that it existed). However, in Glen Ridge I,
the court of appeals, in two carefully reasoned opinions,94 concluded
that Congress did intend to confer adjudicatory authority upon the
FSLIC, but that such authority was indeed a violation of Article III.9
Since the Texas Supreme Court refused to reach the constitutional
issue, 96 the court of appeals decision represents the only opinion to
date in which a court has directly confronted these underlying consti-
tutional concerns.
The conflict among the circuits concerning whether the FSLIC
could adjudicate creditor claims set the stage for the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.97 In Coit the Court stated
flatly that the FSLIC did not have the power, under 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(b) and (d), to adjudicate creditor claims
against the assets of a failed savings and loan association under
FSLIC receivership. 98 By so holding, the Court blasted away the very
foundation of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hudspeth.99
The Court emphasized that the "plain language" of section
1729(b) and (d) could not be read to confer upon the FSLIC the
power to adjudicate creditor claims with the force of law."° The
Court noted, as had the Ninth Circuit in Morrison-Knudsen,' that it
is reasonable to infer that Congress would certainly have enacted
more elaborate provisions governing both procedural and substantive
rights of creditors and providing for judicial review of decisions if it
92. 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.
1988) (per curiam).
93. For a more detailed analysis of these opinions, see Baxter, supra note 71, at 447-49.
94. Id. These were two motions for rehearing in the court of appeals.
95. 734 S.W.2d at 386.
96. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd., 750 S.W.2d 757, 758-59 (1988)
(affirming the court of appeals' decision on the ground that statutory authority to adjudicate
did not even exist).
97. 109 S. Ct. 1361 (1989).
98. Id. at 1368.
99. Id. at 1369.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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intended to confer adjudicatory authority upon the FSLIC in its ca-
pacity as receiver.'0 2
The Court next addressed whether state and federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction over the claims of a creditor of an insolvent sav-
ings and loan association of which the FSLIC is appointed receiver.
The Court found that, when read in its statutory context, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(A) did not divest either state or federal courts of subject
matter jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims against such
institutions. °3 Neither did judicial resolution of creditor claims,
within the meaning of section 1464(d)(6)(C), "restrain or affect" the
FSLIC's exercise of its statutorily mandated receivership function of
distributing assets."° Furthermore, the Court noted that several
other federal statutes'0 5 indicate that Congress clearly envisaged that
the courts had subject matter jurisdiction over creditor suits against
the FSLIC as receiver.10 6
Finally, the Court held that creditors need not exhaust the Bank
Board's existing administrative claims procedure before filing suit in
state court because the procedure was "inadequate."'' 07 According to
the Court, the Bank Board's present regulations establishing the
FSLIC claims procedure 1°8 exceeded its statutorily conferred author-
ity in two respects.0 9 First, by purporting "to confer adjudicatory
authority on the FSLIC and the Bank Board to make binding findings
of fact and conclusions of law which were subject only to judicial re-
102. 109 S. Ct. at 1369. The Court noted that the statutory provisions that expressly em-
power the FSLIC and the Bank Board to adjudicate violations of federal law, to issue cease-
and-desist orders, to remove officers and directors, and to impose civil sanctions precisely enu-
merate both the agency procedures to be followed along with the available remedies, making
explicit reference to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(d)(7)(A), 17300)(2) (1982).
103. 109 S. Ct. at 1369-70.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1370-71. The National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c)(4), provides
that the FSLIC can "sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law or equity, State
or Federal." The Housing Act of 1954, 12 U.S.C. § 1728(c), amended the NHA by establish-
ing a statute of limitations for suits against the FSLIC to enforce deposit insurance claims (the
most common claim in thrift liquidations at that time). Most significantly, Congress expressly
granted subject matter jurisdiction to state courts by its passage of 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1)
(1982) (the same statute that contains the "restrain or affect" language of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982)). The proviso clause of 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) points out the types of
suits Congress expected the FSLIC to defend in state courts, according to the Court. These
suits include actions by creditors against the FSLIC as receiver of state-chartered thrifts.
106. 109 S. Ct. at 1371.
107. Id. at 1375-76.
108. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 43853, 43856, 43858 (1988) to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 575.1, 575.13(o)(6), 576.5(e).
109. 109 S. Ct. at 1375.
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view, presumably under the Administrative Procedure Act, the regu-
lations deprived creditors of de novo judicial determination" of their
claims. 1° Second, the Bank Board's regulations failed to "place a
clear and reasonable time limit"' on the FSLIC's consideration of
whether to pay, settle, or disallow [creditor] claims.""' 2
While Justices Blackmun and Scalia concurred in the majority's
opinion that the FSLIC did not have adjudicatory authority, they
shared differing views from both the majority and one another con-
cerning the exhaustion of remedies issue. 113 Justice Blackmun felt
that the majority's opinion on the exhaustion issue amounted to noth-
ing more than an advisory opinion, based on a guess of what the Bank
Board might someday conclude it must do pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(b)(1)(A)(v), to liquidate insolvent thrifts "in an orderly
manner." 114
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, expressed the view that Coit "is
not about exhaustion, it is about preemption.""' He opined that
there existed neither any precedent nor any sound policy justification
for using the doctrine of exhaustion as a basis for preempting state
law and imposing upon the Bank Board the obligation to enumerate
by rule a specific time period within which the FSLIC must act upon
creditor claims. 6 Thus, while he joined "in the reversal of the deci-
sion below," 1' 7 Justice Scalia did so "on the more categorical ground
that FSLIC's claim procedures cannot preempt the filing of suits
110. Id.
111. Id. The Court agreed with Coit that the FSLIC claims adjudication procedure
"give[s] FSLIC virtually unlimited discretion to bury claims like Coit's in the administrative
process." 109 S. Ct. at 1375. As of the date of oral argument, Coit's claim had been pending
before the FSLIC for over 13 months, yet the agency had not even made its initial determina-
tion. In the words of Justice O'Connor: "Since the Bank Board itself can take six months to
dispose of any appeal, Coit's claim has essentially been relegated to a 'black hole' from which it
may not emerge before the statute of limitations on Coit's state law claims has run." Id.
Also, it is interesting to note in light of this portion of the Court's holding, that on March
22, 1989 (the day after the Coit decision came down), the Bank Board issued "a rule requiring
that no person may sue the FSLIC as receiver for a savings institution unless the person has
presented written notice to the receiver. . . and afforded the receiver 180 days in which to
evaluate any potential claims." 54 Fed. Reg. 12414 (1989).
112. 109 S. Ct. at 1375.
113. Id. at 1376-78.
114. Id. at 1376. The majority, however, was of the opinion that "[i]n our view, it is incor-
rect to characterize our exhaustion analysis in this section as a ruling that the enabling legisla-
tion of FSLIC and the Bank Board 'preempts' state law." Id. at 1375.
115. Id. at 1376.
116. Id. at 1376-77.
117. Id. at 1378. Note that Coit's claims were state law claims. See supra notes 4-8 and
accompanying text.
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under state law."'' 18
The Coit decision may have created as many questions for the
practicing attorney as it answered. For example, first, is the six
month (180 day) time limit provided by the Bank Board in 54 Fed.
Reg. 124149 "a reasonable time limit"' 20 within the meaning of
Coit? Second, does the Bank Board's promulgation of 54 Fed. Reg.
12414 resurrect the FSLIC's formerly "inadequate" claims procedure
and mean that creditors must now exhaust the newly defined adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit in court? Third, does Coit mean that
all those claims that have been lingering for more than six (6) months
are now subject to judicial review if the plaintiff creditors desire to file
suit?' 2' Fourth, will Coit cause unprecedented administrative and fi-
nancial hardship on the federal receiver 122 so that the agency will be
unable to perform its most fundamental and important congressio-
118. Id. The Court failed to address the case in which a state statute of limitations expired
during a "reasonable waiting period established by FSLIC." Id. at 1375.
119. See supra note 111.
120. Coit could very well create a wave of complex and extended litigation. See Wall Street
J., Mar. 22, 1989 at A8, col. 1. "It [the Coit decision] sounds like an administrative
nightmare," said Ronald Glancz, a Washington-based banking attorney. "It's a free-for-all.
Everybody goes to court." Id. For cases decided after Coit, see Sandia Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. FSLIC, 109 S. Ct. 2058 (1989); Zohdi v. FSLIC, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); FSLIC v.
Quality Inns, Inc., 876 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1989); FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 870 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir.
1989); NPSA Serv. Corp. v. Indep. Amer. Ass'n, FSLA, 868 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir. 1989); Buck-
ner Dev. Group v. First Sav. & Loan of Burkburnett, Texas, 873 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1989); Tax
Invs., Ltd. v. FSLIC, 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8991 (N.D. I11. 1989); Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v.
Sunbelt Say. FSB, 714 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Michael Gulley v. Sunbelt Sav. FSB,
714 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Tex. 1989); FSLIC v. Joseph Coleman, 1989 W.L. 65153 (D. Colo.
1989); FSLIC v. 52 Park Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Shepherd Fin. Group v.
FSLIC, 709 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp.
1088 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Woodlands II and the Creek Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City Sav. &
Loan Ass'n of San Angelo, 703 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Hunter, 100 Bankr. 321
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989); In re University Drive Professional Complex, Inc., 1989 Bankr. Lexis
916 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
The FDIC, as the FSLIC's successor, is said to be "playing hardball" in attempting to
keep creditor claims out of court. See S&L Resolution Report (BNA) vol. 0, no. 0 at 19-28
(Sept. 5, 1989). For example, on August 9, 1989, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral
argument concerning whether plaintiffs' claims against S&Ls which have been placed in receiv-
ership are moot because there are no assets left to distribute. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., No. 89-1026 (5th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of this and other cases
articulating the federal receivers' desperate but ingenious new arguments, see supra this note,
S&L Resolution Report.
FDIC General Counsel John Douglas estimated that the FDIC is currently involved in
approximately 70,000 active lawsuits, including cases assumed from the FSLIC. Id. Speaking
at an August 25, 1989 Federal Bar Association meeting in Washington, D.C., Douglas said he
believes the FDIC can dispense with half of these cases within a year, by using already existing
agency powers and powers granted to it by the FIRREA. Id.
121. See supra note 120 for post-Coit decisions.
122. See supra note 40.
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nally mandated task of protecting thrift depositors from the loss of
their savings?
Coit quite simply demands a legislative remedy. By its decision
in Coit, the Supreme Court effectively usurped an admittedly procras-
tinating Congress' legislative responsibility. Although not specifically
addressed in Colt, because of the vagueness and ambiguity inherent in
the complex statutory scheme involved, the constitutional concerns 23
will continue to hover over any substantive receiver role in the credi-
tor claims adjudication process.12 4
What effect Colt will have on President Bush's "S&L bailout
plan" is unclear. 125 The Bush plan establishes a claims procedure
similar to the one set up by the Bank Board prior to the Hudspeth
decision, which gave the Bank Board considerably broader power. 12 6
Congress, through its approval of the Bush plan, 127 could very well
have formulated a claims procedure that will avoid both the pitfalls
that the high court found in the Bank Board and the FSLIC
procedures, as well as one which can survive a constitutional
challenge. 
29
Both the ambiguity of the existing statutory scheme and the need
to maintain the viability of the federal receiver 30 in light of the cur-
rent thrift predicament accentuate the need for Congress to immedi-
ately clarify its intent as to the role of the receiver in the adjudication
of creditor claims. A just and expedient resolution of the "savings
and loan crisis," as well as the future of the federal receiver as a
strong, efficient, and effective federal agency, depend upon it. In the
meantime, Coit certainly promises to keep the courts jam-packed with
123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
124. See 109 S. Ct. at 1371. Because it concluded that Congress never intended to em-
power the FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach any of
the constitutional challenges raised by Coit. The Court did note, however, that both the usury
and breach of fiduciary duty claims raised by Coit involved "private rights" which are at the
core" of "matters normally reserved to article III courts." Id.
125. See Wall Street J., Mar. 22, 1989, at A8, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989,
at Dl, col. 6.
126. See Wall Street J., Mar. 22, 1989, at A8, col. 1.
127. See supra note 40.
128. Id. For a summary and explanation of the newly created claims procedure, see Bank-
ing Report (BNA) at 14, supra note 40. See also Fed. Banking L. Rep., supra note 40 at
2212, § 212. Whether this claims procedure can survive the Coit Court's scrutiny remains to
be seen.
129. See Baxter, supra note 71.
130. See supra note 40.
456 [Vol. 12:441
1989-90] RESCUING CREDITOR CLAIMS 457
both government receiver and S&L creditor attorneys. 13'
J. Michael Pickens
131. To remain abreast of matters concerning all facets of the thrift crisis resolution, see
BNAP's S & L Resolution Report, supra note 120.

